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ABSTRACT
There is growing support for taxes on short-term capital inflows in emerging markets, such as
the encaje adopted by Chile from 1991-98. Previous empirical assessments of the encaje
conclude that it may have generated some small economic benefits, such as shifting the
composition of capital inflows to a longer maturity, but no significant economic costs. Managers
of small and medium-sized companies in Chile, however, claim that the encaje made it
substantially more difficult to obtain financing for productive investment. This paper assesses
whether the Chilean capital controls increased financial constraints for different-sized, publicly-
traded firms. It uses two different testing methodologies: a Tobin's q and Euler-equation
framework. Results indicate that during the encaje, smaller traded firms in Chile experienced
significant financial constraints and these constraints decreased as firm size increased. Both
before and after the encaje, however, no group of traded firms experienced significant financial
constraints, and there is no relationship between firm size and financial constraints. Although
Chilean-style capital controls may also yield benefits, this cost of the encaje could be particularly











In the early and mid-1990's, most international economists and Washington-based policymakers 
supported rapid capital account liberalization for emerging markets. Many countries followed this 
advice. The initial results were generally positive – increased capital inflows, investment booms, 
and impressive growth performance. In the last decade, however, several countries with recently 
liberalized capital accounts experienced severe financial crises, such as Mexico, Thailand, Korea, 
Russia, and Argentina. These experiences, especially when combined with the recent backlash 
against globalization, have caused many people to question the benefits of unrestricted capital 
flows.
1 Could controls on capital flows have prevented these crises, or at least reduced their 
virulence? This question recently gained prominent attention when the U.S. government insisted 
that free-trade agreements with Singapore and Chile include strict restrictions on their ability to 
use capital controls in the future. 
Although there continues to be widespread disagreement on the desirability and 
feasibility of certain types of capital controls, such as a Tobin-style tax on currency transactions 
or limits on capital outflows during crises, there is increasing and fairly widespread support for 
market-based taxes on short-term capital inflows. For example, The Economist concluded a recent 
survey on global finance with the statement: “…some kinds of restriction on inflows (not 
outflows) of capital will make sense for many developing countries.”
2 The most well known 
example of a market-based tax on capital inflows is the encaje adopted by Chile from 1991-98. 
Even the IMF, formerly the bastion of capital market liberalization, has cautiously begun to 
support these sorts of controls. For example, Stanley Fischer, former First Deputy Managing 
Director of the IMF writes: “The IMF has cautiously supported the use of market-based capital 
inflow controls, Chilean style.”
3  Eduardo Aninat, a Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, 
recently stated: “…in some circumstances, these controls on capital inflows can play a role in 
reducing vulnerability created by short-term flows….The investment restrictions appear to have 
served Chile well…”
4 IMF officials have even suggested that other emerging markets, such as 
Russia, could benefit from adopting similar capital controls in certain circumstances.
5  
                                                 
1 For an excellent study on the effects of financial globalizations, see Prasad et al. (2003). 
2 The Economist, “A Cruel Sea of Capital: A Survey of Global Finance.” 05/03/98, pg 24.  
3 Fischer (2002). 
4 Wall Street Journal, “Some Warm to Use of Capital Controls,” by Pamela Druckerman. 10/24/02. 
5 For example, in an interview for the March 17, 2003 IMF Survey, John Odling-Smee, Director of the 
IMF’s European II Department, stated that in some circumstances for Russia “..we would support some 
kind of market-friendly capital controls, such as the Chilean-type controls, to try to discourage speculative 
inflows.”   2
A series of empirical studies have supported this sea-change in attitudes by providing 
fairly positive or neutral assessments of the Chilean capital controls.
6 Although there is some 
variation in the results, most studies conclude that the capital controls shifted the composition of 
capital inflows to a longer maturity and provided a small increase in monetary policy flexibility, 
but had minimal effect on other variables (such as the total volume of capital inflows or exchange 
rate). These studies suggest that the only costs of the controls were relatively minor, such as any 
deadweight loss from the government establishing and monitoring the system, or from firms 
attempting to evade the controls. In other words, the general interpretation of this body of 
empirical work is that the Chilean capital controls generated some small economic benefits, but 
no significant economic costs.  
Managers of small and medium-sized companies in Chile, however, have a different 
interpretation. They claim that the capital controls made it substantially more difficult to obtain 
external financing. One study reports that between 1996 and 1997 (during the encaje) investment 
costs for smaller firms exceeded 20 percent per year, while larger firms could access international 
markets at a cost of only 7-8 percent.
7 It is not surprising, however, that smaller firms in Chile 
faced a higher cost of external capital than larger firms. A large body of theoretical literature 
explains why asymmetric information problems, which tend to be greater in smaller and younger 
firms, will raise the cost of external capital relative to that for internal capital. Moreover, a large 
body of empirical literature documents that firms’ investment decisions tend to be affected by 
their internal sources of funds in a range of countries, especially for smaller firms.
8 
There are a number of reasons, however, why the Chilean capital controls may have 
increased any financial constraints for smaller firms. First, many Chilean firms responded to the 
controls by adopting alternate forms of financing that were not subject to the tax (such as issuing 
ADRs or obtaining direct credit from foreign suppliers). These alternative sources of financing 
were not only more costly than those used before the encaje, but often unavailable to smaller 
firms with less established reputations. Second, and closely related, there were a number of 
loopholes to the capital controls, but finding and developing the mechanisms to utilize these 
loopholes required an up-front fixed cost. For larger firms, this fixed cost could be spread across a 
greater volume of financing, thereby increasing the return to finding the loopholes. As a result, 
larger firms were more likely than smaller firms to search for, find, and utilize these exceptions to 
the encaje, and therefore obtain a relatively lower cost of capital.  
                                                 
6 These studies are discussed in more detail in Section II. 
7 Costs are for dollar borrowing. Cited in Edwards (1999). 
8 These studies are discussed in more detail in Section III.   3
Third, banks tended to have less flexibility avoiding the encaje, since banks are more 
closely monitored by the central government than other firms. As a result, the cost of borrowing 
from banks may have risen more than the cost of borrowing from other institutions that could 
more easily evade the capital controls. Since smaller firms tend to be more reliant on bank loans 
for financing than larger firms, this additional cost would have fallen disproportionately on 
smaller firms, especially since they were less likely to be able to find alternate financing sources. 
Fourth and finally, there is some evidence that the capital controls shifted capital inflows to 
longer maturities. Since smaller firms have a harder time borrowing long-term than larger firms, 
any increase in lending maturities could have disproportionately affected the ability of small 
firms to obtain financing. This effect could have occurred whether the small firms received 
capital inflows directly, or whether they borrowed from banks (which experienced a lengthening 
of their maturities and attempted to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities).  
Several studies of the encaje have mentioned that the capital controls might have made it 
relatively more difficult and expensive for smaller companies to raise financing.
9 None of these 
studies, however, has made any attempt to assess whether these effects were significant or 
economically important. If the capital controls substantially increased the costs and/or constrained 
the ability of smaller firms to obtain capital for productive investment, this inefficient allocation 
of capital and resources may have reduced growth and productivity in Chile. Although the encaje 
may also have had important benefits, countries considering the adoption of Chilean-style capital 
controls should carefully evaluate this potential cost. This could be particularly important for 
emerging markets in which small and new firms are often important sources of job creation and 
economic growth.
10 
Therefore, this paper assesses whether the Chilean capital controls did, in fact, have this 
cost of increasing financial constraints for smaller, publicly-traded firms. It builds on the 
extensive literature on firm-financing constraints to test whether investment decisions in smaller 
and medium-sized traded firms are more dependent on internal finance than in large firms, and if 
any such differences increased during the period that the encaje was in place. Since there is a lack 
of agreement in this literature on the preferred testing framework, it uses the two most common 
methodologies: a Tobin’s q framework and an Euler-equation framework. The implementation of 
the encaje in 1991 and its removal in 1998 provide a natural experiment by which to examine any 
time-series variation in financing constraints for different types of Chilean firms.  
                                                 
9 See Gallego et al. (1999) and Edwards (1999). 
10 McMillan and Woodruff (2002) provide evidence on the importance of small firms and startups in 
promoting job creation and economic growth in the transition economies.   4
The results indicate that investment in smaller, publicly-traded firms was significantly 
affected by internal finances during the period of the encaje, and that these financial constraints 
decreased as firm size increased. During the periods before and after the encaje, however, neither 
small nor large traded firms appear to have been financially constrained, and there is no 
significant relationship between firm size and financial constraints. These results are highly 
robust to an extensive series of sensitivity tests. Moreover, a series of cross-country tests does not 
find any evidence of similar patterns in other emerging markets during the mid-1990’s, 
suggesting that the Chilean results are not driven by global shocks or changes in the external 
environment. Although this effect of the Chilean encaje is only one factor that countries should 
consider when evaluating whether or not to adopt controls on capital inflows, it does suggest an 
important cost of this policy.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II provides background information on 
the Chilean capital controls and briefly surveys the empirical literature assessing the 
macroeconomic impact of these controls. Section III discusses the extensive literature testing for 
the presence of firm-financing constraints. It evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of 
different testing frameworks, and then develops two models that are used in the remainder of the 
paper. Section IV discusses the data set and examines trends in several variables for evidence of 
any impact of the encaje on different-sized, publicly-traded firms. Section V discusses several 
econometric issues and then estimates the base model. It also reports an extensive series of 
sensitivity tests and results for other emerging markets. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II.  Background on the Chilean Capital Controls 
Chile, as well as many other emerging markets, experienced a surge of capital inflows between 
1988 and 1991. Largely in response, the Chilean government enacted a series of capital account 
restrictions in 1991. The encaje, or unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), was a key 
component of these restrictions. It requires that a fraction of certain types of capital inflows must 
be deposited at the central bank in a non-interest bearing account for a fixed term. The encaje was 
initially set at a rate of 20 percent and only applied to fixed-income securities and foreign loans, 
excluding trade credits (as long as the shipment occurred within 6 months). The tax did not 
initially include portfolio flows or FDI. The holding period at the central bank was initially equal 
to the loan’s maturity, with a minimum of 90 days and maximum of 1 year. Investors were also 
given the option of either making the deposit at the central bank, as described above, or paying an 
up-front fee equivalent to the interest cost of the URR.   5
The primary goal of the encaje was to moderate the appreciation of the Chilean peso in 
order to maintain competitive export prices. A secondary goal was to regulate short-term capital 
inflows, especially from banks and institutional investors, and therefore moderate the buildup of 
speculative short-term liabilities. A final goal was to increase the ability of the central bank to 
effectively use monetary policy by creating a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates. 
This concern was particularly important because the government sought to reduce inflation, 
which was becoming increasingly difficult as any attempt to reduce demand by raising interest 
rates was often overwhelmed by the expansionary effect of capital inflows. Reflecting this 
combination of goals, the capital controls initially only covered short–term borrowing and debt, 
and only later expanded to cover equities and other types of portfolio flows. It is worth noting that 
initially a primary focus of the encaje was not to reduce Chile’s vulnerability to contagion or 
global financial turmoil – a central motivation for other countries considering these controls. 
During the 7-year period after the encaje was enacted, it was continually modified.
11 
These changes were aimed mainly at closing loopholes frequently discovered by investors and 
borrowers, although occasionally several were designed to adapt to changes in the economic 
environment. These modifications are summarized in Appendix A and include virtually all 
aspects of the encaje, such as: the fraction of the capital inflow deposited; the types of inflows 
covered; the currency for the deposit or fee payment; the duration of the holding period; and the 
restrictions on rolling-over maturing investments. In 1998, as capital flows to emerging markets 
dwindled, the encaje was suspended. Some of the most noteworthy changes to the encaje between 
1991 and 1998, based on Appendix A, were: 
 
•  1992: Fraction of the capital inflow deposited in the central bank was increased from 
20% to 30%. The minimum holding period was extended to 1 year. 
 
•  1995: Coverage was extended to include secondary ADRs. Also, the deposit in the 
central bank (and calculation of the corresponding fee) had to be made in US dollars. 
This substantially raised the cost of the encaje.
12  
                                                 
11 During this period, there were also modifications to variety of capital account restrictions in addition to 
the encaje.
 For example, there were changes to maturity requirements, minimum size restrictions, and 
minimum solvency limitations for the issuance of bonds or equity abroad. There was also a continual 
liberalization of controls on capital outflows, such as the minimum stay period for investment abroad and 
ceilings on foreign asset holdings by financial institutions. See Gallego et al (1999), Simone and Sorsa 
(1999), and Ariyoshi et al (2000) for detailed information on this evolution of capital account restrictions 
over the 1990’s. Section VI also discusses how these changes could affect estimates of the impact of the 
encaje on firm-financing constraints. 
12 Before 1995, investors could choose the currency of the deposit. Many chose the yen, which reduced the 
implicit cost of the encaje as the yen depreciated against the dollar. Simone and Sorsa (1999) estimate that 
changing the currency requirement raised the implicit cost of the URR by 50-100 percent.   6
 
•  1996: Coverage was extended to include “speculative investment from FDI” (defined as 
FDI which “does not increase productive capacity”).   
 
•  1998: Fraction of the capital inflow deposited in the central bank was decreased to 0%.  
 
During the period from 1991 to 1998, the actual cost of the encaje depended on the 
maturity and/or permanence of the capital inflow, as well as the opportunity cost of the funds, 
with shorter-term inflows subject to a higher implicit tax (since the duration of the deposit is 
fixed). Table 1 reports estimates of the actual cost of the encaje for borrowings of different 
maturities between 1991 and 1998. It shows that although the cost fell quickly over time, it was 
still substantial for longer-term borrowing. For example, in 1997 the cost of the URR was 9.4% 
per year for 3-month borrowing and 2.4% for 1-year borrowing. The table also shows that the 
changes in the encaje lead to substantial fluctuations in its cost over time. The cost increased in 
the first few years after the encaje was initially implemented, reaching a peak of 10.3% for 3-
month borrowing in 1995. The cost fell slightly after 1995, but remained elevated until the encaje 
was ended in 1998.  
There is some evidence, however, that although the tax rate was highest between 1994 
and 1997, the actual impact on capital inflows may have declined over time. The central bank’s 
attempts to continually close loopholes and tighten the encaje were generally effective in the 
short term, but over time investors and firms found new ways to evade the controls and any new 
restrictions.
13 One of the most common strategies was to shift capital inflows to sources that were 
not currently subject to the encaje (such as redefining capital inflows as trade credit). Central 
bank data show that in 1992, the URR covered about half of total gross inflows, but in subsequent 
years coverage declined to 24 percent. Despite this evasion, the large revenues collected by the 
Chilean government suggest that the encaje still affected a substantial volume of capital inflows. 
Between June 1991 and September 1998, collection of the URR (including both the actual money 
in reserves as well as the equivalents paid in fees) increased central bank reserves by an average 
of 2.0% of GDP, or 40% of the average capital account surplus.
14 
But what was the impact of this tax? Measuring the impact of the encaje is complicated 
by a number of factors, such as: accurately measuring short-term inflows (since firms shifted 
                                                 
13 See Simone and Sorsa (1999) for discussions of the effectiveness of the capital controls and evidence on 
their avoidance. Some authors, such as Cowan and de Gregorio (1998), argue that their “power” declined 
between 1995 and 1997 as evasion increased. Other authors, such as Gallego et al (1999), however, argue 
that their “power” increased steadily over time until the controls were removed in 1998. Valdés-Prieto and 
Soto (1998) also argue that the encaje was most effective after 1995. 
14 Gallego et al (1999).   7
financing to trade credit, which is generally not included in short-term inflows); controlling for 
changes in the macro-environment (and especially the general increase in capital flows to 
emerging markets during this period); and controlling for simultaneous changes in other Chilean 
policies that could affect capital flows (such as the liberalization of capital outflows and 
improvements in banking system supervision and regulation). Despite these methodological 
challenges, a number of empirical papers have attempted to measure how the encaje impacted a 
series of macroeconomic variables.
15 The studies use a range of modeling strategies, definitions, 
and econometric methodologies, and reach several general conclusions. First, there is no evidence 
that the encaje affected the exchange rate. Second, there is little evidence that the capital controls 
protected Chile from the shocks emanating from other emerging markets during the Mexican, 
Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. Third, there is some evidence that the encaje had no 
significant effect on the total volume of capital inflows (although this result is subject to the 
caveat that it is extremely difficult to construct the counterfactual of what the volume of capital 
inflows would have been without the encaje). Fourth, there is some evidence that the capital 
controls shifted the composition of capital inflows to longer maturities. Fifth and finally, there is 
some evidence that the encaje raised domestic interest rates by creating a wedge between 
domestic and foreign interest rates (although there is no agreement on whether this was a short- or 
long-run effect). Therefore, this series of results can be summarized as suggesting that the 
Chilean capital controls may have had a positive, albeit weak, impact on Chile’s macroeconomy. 
Despite the attention paid to the impact of the encaje on Chile’s macroeconomy, there 
has been no analysis of how the capital controls impacted micro-level variables, such as 
individual firms and their cost of capital.
16 The only paper that partially addresses this question, 
albeit indirectly, is Gallego and Loayza (2000). They provide a detailed review of the rapid 
growth in Chilean financial markets over the past 3 decades, and then examine how this growth 
affected financial development for a set of 79 publicly-listed firms between 1985 and 1995. In the 
section most closely related to this paper, Gallego and Loayza use a Tobin’s q model and find that 
between 1985 and 1990, a firm’s investment was not significantly affected by q, but was 
positively affected by cash flow and negatively by debt ratios.
17 During 1991-96, however, a 
                                                 
15 Simone and Sorsa (1999) provide an excellent survey of the empirical work on this subject, as well as a 
detailed discussion of the methodological and econometric problems. Four noteworthy examples of these 
empirical studies are Edwards (1998), Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998), Gallego et al (1999), De Gregorio et 
al (2000). Edwards (2000) is one of the few studies to examine whether the capital controls reduced 
financial contagion. 
16 Work in progress by Gallego and Hernández (2002), however, is examining how the Chilean capital 
controls affect financial expenditures and balance sheets of Chilean firms. 
17 This Tobin’s q model is discussed in Section III.   8
firm’s investment became more responsive to q and less to cash flow and debt ratios. This 
suggests that although firms were financially constrained during the late 1980’s, these constraints 
were reduced in the first half of the 1990’s. Although their paper does not explicitly discuss the 
impact of the encaje on financial constraints, the results suggest that during the early years of the 
encaje, firm financing constraints were actually lower, instead of higher, than before the capital 
controls were enacted. Moreover, Gallego and Loayza focus on measuring average financing 
constraints in Chile, and do not test for differences between small and large firms.
18 Therefore, 
the impact of the encaje on the financing constraints of small versus large Chilean firms remains 
an open question.  
 
 
III.  Testing Framework and Methodology 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that under certain conditions, including frictionless capital 
markets, firms should face the same cost for internal and external finance. As a result, a firm’s 
liquidity and capital structure should not affect its investment decisions. Since this seminal 
article, however, there has been an extensive theoretical literature explaining why informational 
asymmetries and incentive problems can make external financing more expensive than internal 
financing, as well as an extensive empirical literature testing these propositions.
19 Although 
results vary somewhat across studies, the majority of evidence suggests that firms predicted to 
have greater asymmetric information and incentive problems, and therefore be more financially 
constrained, tend to have a greater sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in internal funds. 
Most closely related to this paper, studies of both developed countries and emerging 
markets have found extensive evidence that smaller firms tend to be more financially constrained 
than larger firms.
20 Other studies, such as Love (2001) and Laeven (2002), provide cross-country 
evidence that firms tend to be less financially constrained in countries with more developed or 
liberalized financial markets. Harrison, Love and McMillan (2001) is the only study which 
directly considers the impact of capital controls on firm-financing constraints, although this is 
only a short extension of their more detailed analysis of capital flows and financing constraints. 
They use an Euler-equation model and find that “restrictions on payments for capital account 
                                                 
18 Gallego and Loayza (2000) find evidence, however, that firms eligible for investment in pension funds 
(PFMC-grade firms) were less financially constrained than non PFMC-grade firms before 1990. Since 
PFMC-grade firms tend to be larger than the average Chilean firm, this suggests that smaller firms may 
have been more financially constrained than larger firms during this period. 
19 Stein (2001) and Hubbard (1998) provide excellent and thorough surveys of this theoretical and 
empirical literature, respectively. 
20 See Schiantarelli (1995) for a more detailed review of relevant studies.   9
transactions” increase firm-financial constraints. Their measures of capital controls are based on 
dummy variables constructed by the IMF, however, which are highly problematic.
21 In fact, these 
IMF dummy variables do not show an increase in Chilean capital controls when the encaje was 
enacted. Using a very different approach and methodology, Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) show 
that capital controls affect the asset allocation, financing, transfer pricing, and dividend policy of 
U.S. multinational affiliates. Although they do not directly test for the existence of firm-financing 
constraints, their results suggest that capital controls distort investment decisions. 
Although this empirical literature testing for the micro-effects of capital controls and 
existence of financial constraints is extensive, there continues to be some disagreement on the 
appropriate testing framework. The earliest work on this subject estimated investment equations 
based on Tobin’s q. This methodology, however, has been subject to rather extensive criticism, 
and more recent work has focused on direct estimation of Euler equations. Since each of these 
methodologies has different strengths and weaknesses, this paper uses a representative test from 
both frameworks to examine how the encaje affected financing constraints for different-sized, 
publicly-traded firms in Chile. As shown below, the two frameworks yield very similar estimates 
and results, strengthening the paper’s conclusions. The remainder of this section derives the 
central estimating equations, placing the different methodologies within one broad framework, 
and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.  
 
A. The q-based Methodology 
Several different modeling strategies have been used to derive tests for firm-financing constraints 
based on Tobin’s q. In order to facilitate comparisons with the Euler-equation model developed in 
Section III.B., I build on the framework developed in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999), Harrison 
et al (2001), Love (2001), and Laeven (2002).
22 More specifically, assume that each firm 
maximizes its present value, which is the expected discounted value of dividends, subject to a 
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21 Problems with these IMF measures of capital account restrictions have been well documented in other 
work. For example, see Edison et al (2002) or Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002).  
22 None of these papers, however, explicitly develops the q-based framework used in this subsection. Also, 
to simplify the analysis, I follow Love (2001) and Harrison et al. (2001) and exclude debt financing from 
the maximization problem. Including debt financing does not affect the first-order conditions for 
investment. See Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999) or Laeven (2002) for an extension of this framework to 
include debt.   10
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Variables are defined as: t is the current time period; s represents increments to t; Kt is the 
capital stock at the start of period t; ξt is a productivity shock; Dt is the dividend paid to 
shareholders over the period t; Et[] is the expectations operator conditional on information 
available at time t; β is a discount factor; Π is the profit function (already maximized with respect 
to variable costs); C is the adjustment cost function; It is investment over the period t; and δ is the 
depreciation rate for capital.  
Equation (1) can be rewritten as a Bellman equation so that the first-order condition for 
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Next, define marginal qt (measured at the end of period t or the start of t+1) as the increase in the 















q .          ( 5 )  
 
In order to obtain a closed-form solution, it is necessary to specify the adjustment cost 
function. I make the standard assumptions of linear homogeneity in capital and investment. I also 
extend this standard function slightly to allow for persistence in adjustment costs, period-specific 
shocks, and a firm-specific level of investment that minimizes adjustment costs:
23 
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23 Harrison et al (2001), Laeven (2002), and Love (2001) also included a lagged term for investment and a 
firm-specific effect in the adjustment cost function.   11
where α1 and α2 are constants, αi is a fixed effect for each firm i, and αt are period-specific 
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Next, substitute (5) and (7) into (4), rearrange terms, and replace constants (including 
combinations of constants) with parameters. Finally, assume rational expectations, so that the 
expectations operator is replaced with realized values plus an expectational error. The 
expectational error (εit) is assumed to be orthogonal to any information available when the 
investment decision is made (at the start of the period) so that the orthogonality condition is 
E[εt|xt-s]=0 for s≥1. The resulting equation is: 
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where fi are fixed effects for each firm i, and dt are period-specific effects. According to this 
model, a firm’s financial condition should have no impact on investment. In other words, under 
the assumptions of convex adjustment costs, value maximization, perfect competition, linear 
homogeneous technology, and capital as the only quasi-fixed input, the marginal value of Tobin’s 
q should control for the expected future profitability of investment. To test the validity of this 
result, papers have added a term measuring firms’ internal financial positions to equation (8) in 
order to evaluate whether financial constraints affect investment. For example, equation (8) is 

































1 0    (8′) 
 
where Cashit is a measure of firm i’s internal financial position (such as the firm’s cash stock at 
the start of the period or cash flow in the current or previous period). Therefore, a test for the 
existence of firm-financing constraints is a test of the null hypothesis that θ3 = 0 in equation (8′).  
A common use of this testing framework is to divide a sample of firms based on a 
characteristic that is a priori expected to affect financial constraints (such as firm size or   12
membership in a banking conglomerate), and then test if θ3 is significantly different across the 
groups of firms. For example, in the first of an extensive series of papers using this framework, 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) estimate a variant of equation (8′) for firms that have either 
low or high dividend payout ratios. Their equivalent of θ3 is positive and significant for firms 
with lower dividend payout ratios, suggesting that this group of firms is financially constrained.
24 
Instead of dividing the sample of firms into two groups based on dividend policy or firm 
size (or any variable of interest that might affect financial constraints), a common variant of this 
testing framework is to interact the variable measuring financial constraints with a measure of the 
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Therefore, if Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 for large firms, then a test if firm-financing 
constraints are greater for small than large firms is a test of the null hypothesis that θ3>θ4.Or, if 
Size is a continuous measure of firm size, then a test if financial constraints exist for small firms 
and decrease with firm size is a test of the null hypothesis that θ3>0 and θ4<0. Although more 
recent papers have proposed adding a number of different control variables to equation (9) and/or 
testing whether different types of firms are financially constrained, this q-based methodology 
continues to be widely used in tests of firm’s financial constraints.  
This testing methodology, however, has a number of weaknesses.
25 First, since it is 
virtually impossible to measure marginal q, most studies use average q, which will only equal 
marginal q under fairly restrictive assumptions.
26 Second, if stock markets are inefficient, 
observed stock market valuations (which are a component of q) may diverge from the manager’s 
valuation of the marginal return on capital. Third, and closely related to both of these concerns, if 
marginal q is mismeasured for any reason, then the estimated coefficients on the financial 
constraints’ variable (or other explanatory variables) could capture shocks to investment 
opportunities instead of financial constraints.
27 Fourth, the a priori classification of firms between 
those expected to be constrained or unconstrained could lead to misclassifications if firms switch 
                                                 
24 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique this article and testing framework and claim to reverse the central 
results. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) respond to this critique. 
25 See Schiantarelli (1995) or Hubbard (1998) for a more detailed description of these issues.  
26 Hayashi (1982) derives these assumptions, which include: perfect competition in factor and product 
markets, perfect capital markets, and constant returns to scale in production technology.  
27 See Erickson and Whited (2000) for a discussion of problems with measurement error in q.   13
between the two states. Moreover, if the classifications are correlated with other variables in the 
equation, estimates and test statistics will be biased and inconsistent. Finally, the assumptions 
underlying the basic q-theory of investment, such as convex adjustment costs or value 
maximization, may not hold. 
Despite these potential shortcomings, this q-based methodology continues to be widely 
used in this literature. This approach is not only intuitive, straightforward to implement, and 
based on strong theoretical foundations, but some authors argue that under certain assumptions, 
the q-based methodology may be better than more complicated testing frameworks. For these 
reasons, as well as to facilitate comparisons with previous work, Section V uses this q-based 
equation (9) to test how the encaje affected financing constraints for different sized firms in 
Chile. The sensitivity analysis also tests several extensions of this q-based model.  
 
B. The Euler-equation Methodology 
Due to the problems with the q-based methodology discussed above, a number of studies have 
instead opted to directly estimate the firm’s Euler equation to test for the presence of firm-
financing constraints. This approach is based on the same basic maximization problem used to 
derive the q-based equations, but makes a number of different assumptions and rearranges the 
first-order conditions. The following derivation continues to closely follow that in Harrison et al. 
(2001), Love (2001), and Laeven (2002), all of which build on Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999).  
Assume that a firm faces the same optimization problem outlined in equations (1) 
through (3), plus the additional constraint that dividends must be non-negative:  
 
0 ≥ t D .         ( 1 0 )  
 
If λ is the multiplier for the constraint in (10), then the first-order condition (previously equation 
(4)) combined with the definition in (5) is: 
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and the envelope condition is: 
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Combining (11) and (12) to eliminate qt and qt-1 yields the Euler equation:
28 
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The key variable of interest in the following analysis is () t t λ λ + + + 1 1 1 , which is the relative 
shadow cost of external financing in period t+1 versus period t (i.e., the measure of financial 
constraints). More specifically, in perfect capital markets, λt=λt+1. On the other hand, if the 
shadow cost of external funds is higher today (at t) than tomorrow (at t+1), then 
() t t λ λ + + + 1 1 1 <1 and the firm is “financially constrained.” 
Next, in order to estimate equation (13), assume that the term measuring financial 
constraints can be written as a function of firm-specific financing constraints and the firm’s cash 
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Also, define MPKt as the marginal profit of capital, net of adjustment costs and financing 
costs (which is the term in {} in equation (13)). If production follows a Cobb-Douglas function, 
which can have fixed costs and quasi-fixed factors of production (other than K), then MPKt can 
be expressed as: 
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28 I also follow previous literature and set ( ) 0 = ∂
∂
t K
C , since this is a second-order effect. See additional 
appendix to Love (2001) for a detailed explanation and evidence supporting this assumption. 
29 The sensitivity analysis also shows that redefining financial constraints as a function of cash flow in the 
current (or last period) has no significant impact on the results.   15
where ϑi is a firm-fixed effect, ϑ1,t is the ratio of capital’s share in production to the markup, and 
Sales is total sales.
30  
Assume that the adjustment cost function and resulting marginal adjustment cost function 
are still specified by (6) and (7). Finally, since E() t t λ λ + + + 1 1 1 ≅1, it is possible to use a first-
order Taylor approximation around the means to rewrite equation (13). Continuing to assume 
rational expectations, and inserting the terms defined in equations (14), (15) and (7) into equation 
(13) yields the central estimating equation based on the Euler-equation framework:  
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(16) 
 
Therefore, if Size is a dummy variable equal to 1 for large firms, then a test if firm-
financing constraints are lower for large firms than for small firms is a test of the null hypothesis 
that θ4<θ3. Or, if Size is a continuous measure of firm size, then a test if financial constraints exist 
for small firms and decrease with firm size is a test of the null hypothesis that θ3>0 and θ4<0.  
This testing strategy based on the Euler equation has several important advantages over 
the q-based methodology. First, it circumvents the numerous problems related to measuring 
marginal q. The model should therefore better control for the impact of shocks to future 
profitability on investment decisions, reducing any bias to the estimated coefficients on financial 
constraints. Second, the Euler-equation framework permits the explicit modeling of the shadow 
cost of financing as a function of a firm’s cash stock (or other proxies for financial constraints).  
Despite these important advantages, the Euler-equation methodology also has several 
shortcomings. First, it requires imposing a high degree of structure on the estimating equation, 
such as the normalization technique and form of the financial constraints. Results can be 
extremely sensitive to model specification, and a rejection of the “no financial constraints” 
hypothesis could occur for a number of reasons other than capital market imperfections. Second, 
tests based on the Euler-equation methodology have poor small sample properties. Third, this 
methodology relies on period-by-period restrictions derived from the firm’s first-order conditions, 
so that it may not capture financial constraints that exist across periods. Fourth, the model 
assumes one discount rate for all firms and time periods, and although some of this effect may be 
                                                 
30 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999) and Love (2002, additional appendix) provide a proof of this 
derivation. I have added the firm-fixed effect.    16
captured in the firm- and period-specific effects, any residual correlation between discount rates 
and cash stocks or flows could bias estimates. Fifth and finally, this approach does not yield 
structural estimates of the key variables, so it is necessary to make assumptions about additional 




The dataset used to estimate the two models developed in Section III is based on the Worldscope, 
September 2002 CD-ROM.
31 I include all non-financial firms located in Chile that reported any 
information in the database between 1988 and 2002.
32 Since the database only reports financial 
data for the last 10 years, I augment the data with information from the Worldscope, May 1999 
CD-ROM, excluding any firms for which the time series between the two sources is inconsistent. 
I also exclude extreme outliers and unrealistic observations for the key variables used to estimate 
equations (9) and (16). Each of these steps is described in detail in Appendix B.  
The Worldscope database only reports information that is publicly available, so most of 
the sample consists of publicly-traded companies. This has the obvious disadvantage that since 
many smaller firms are not publicly listed, they are underrepresented in the dataset. As a result, 
the analysis in this paper can only be interpreted as evidence of how the encaje affects different-
sized, publicly-traded firms, and not necessarily as evidence on how the encaje affected small, 
private firms. Focusing mainly on publicly-listed companies, however, has two important 
advantages. First, disclosure requirements for public listing (which are fairly stringent in Chile, 
especially compared to other emerging markets) imply that the financial statistics in the dataset 
are more comprehensive and reliable than for most non-public firms. Second, Tobin’s q is 
calculated based on companies’ market valuations, so that this database includes the only group 
of firms that could be included in any analysis using the q-based approach.  
Table 2 reports the number of firms in the sample by year and broad industry group. The 
number of firms is substantially lower at the beginning of the period – largely because 
Worldscope is a fairly new data set and coverage has steadily improved over time. Therefore, 
although firms continuously “enter” the sample, many of these entrants are not newly 
incorporated firms. The middle of the table reports the number of financial firms included in 
                                                 
31 The Worldscope-Disclosure database is produced by Thomson Financial and includes detailed profiles, 
financial, and market information for about 32,000 companies, representing about 96 percent of the world’s 
market capitalization. See Forbes (2000) for more detailed information on the database.  
32 More specifically, I exclude all financial, insurance, and real estate firms, defined as reporting a primary 
SIC code of 6. Only 6 firms exit the sample due to bankruptcy, merger, purchase, or any factor that 
Worldscope classifies as rendering a firm “inactive”.    17
Worldscope but excluded from the dataset used for this paper, as well as the number of firms 
included in Worldscope but excluded from this paper due to data availability. The next set of 
rows reports the total number of firms listed on the Chilean stock exchange, as well as the percent 
of listed Chilean firms covered by Worldscope in each year of the sample. In 1988, Worldscope 
covered only 10% of listed firms in Chile, but by 2000 it covered 68% of listed firms.
33 The 
bottom of the table also reports the total market capitalization of firms included in the sample, 
firms covered by Worldscope, and firms in the entire Chilean market. Worldscope coverage has 
increased from 45% of Chilean market capitalization in 1988 to 97% in 2000. These comparisons 
indicate that although the Worldscope database covers most of the Chilean market when judged 
by size, it under-represents smaller, publicly-listed firms.  
As a preliminary analysis of the impact of the encaje on firm-financing constraints in 
Chile, Figures 1 through 6 graph a number of relevant variables between 1988/89 and 2001. 
Figure 1 begins with the average inflation-adjusted peso and foreign currency lending rates in 
Chile (based on IMF data), including both absolute lending rates as well as stripped lending 
rates.
34 Peso lending rates declined fairly sharply around the time that the encaje was enacted, 
although they rose in the first few years of the encaje. Peso lending rates also rose in 1997-98 
during the Asian and Russian crises. Foreign-currency lending rates (mainly for dollars) increased 
slightly in Chile during the encaje, and then fell after the encaje was removed. For example, the 
stripped cost of borrowing on foreign currency rose from 3.3% in 1992 to 4.4% in 1997, and then 
fell to 2.0% in 2001. This could reflect an increased cost of borrowing resulting from the encaje, 
although the magnitude of the effect is fairly small and this could also be driven by other factors, 
such as changes in global risk aversion. Moreover, trends in aggregate interest rates do not 
capture any differential impact of the encaje on small versus large firms. 
Therefore, Figures 2 through 6 focus on trends in key micro-level variables for smaller 
and large publicly-traded firms in Chile, using the dataset discussed above. Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Table 3. I divide the sample into smaller and large firms, based on a 
cutoff of inflation-adjusted assets of 100 billion pesos (equivalent to approximately $250 
million).
35 Figure 2 graphs leverage (total debt to assets) and shows that smaller public firms had 
                                                 
33 Worldscope coverage falls slightly in 2001 due to time lags incorporating the most recent information. 
34 All statistics are calculated based on IMF (2002). Stripped lending rates are defined as lending rates less 
the interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills. Chilean lending rates are lines 22860P..zf and 22860P..fzf. US data 
from line 11160C..zf. Peso lending rates are adjusted for inflation using line 22864..zf. 
35 Inflation adjustment based on the consumer price index as reported in line 22864..zf in IMF (2002) with 
1995 as the base year. The assets-based division of 100 billion pesos is chosen because it is close to the 
sample median of 104 billion pesos. Firms are allowed to switch between small and large in each year. The 
sensitivity analysis examines the impact of using different size divisions, or constraining firms to remain in   18
leverage ratios comparable to larger firms during the later part of the encaje. Leverage ratios for 
large firms, however, fell during the initial years of the encaje and then increased substantially 
after the encaje was removed. This could indicate that large firms shifted to non-traditional 
financing sources during the encaje (i.e. financing that is not included in leverage ratios and was 
excluded from the tax), and then returned to traditional debt financing after the encaje was 
removed. Small firms do not show evidence of similar patterns, and actually show a decline in 
leverage ratios after the encaje. Figure 3 graphs the share of short-term debt in total debt and 
shows that smaller firms had greater shares of short-term debt than larger firms during all years 
(as traditionally documented in the finance literature), with the differential substantially larger 
before and after the encaje. Figure 4 graphs firm stock issuance as a share of beginning-of-period 
capital.
36 Stock issuance increased dramatically for both small and large public firms during the 
initial stages of the encaje from 1991-94, but then declined by a comparable amount during the 
later half of the encaje from 1994-98. These trends are undoubtedly driven by changes in the 
regulations governing secondary ADRs.
37 Patterns of stock issuance for small and large firms, 
however, are fairly similar and dominated by these aggregate trends.  
Finally, Figures 5 and 6 graph investment levels and growth rates. Investment levels are 
fairly volatile, so that it is difficult to discern any consistent trends. At the very start and end of 
the sample (1988 and 2001), however, smaller firms had average investment levels greater than 
large firms, supporting the theory (although clearly not definitive evidence) that the encaje may 
have limited investment for small firms. Somewhat more convincing, investment growth in 
Figure 6 shows more consistent differences between the groups of firms. Investment growth for 
smaller firms was higher than for large firms both before 1991 and after 1998, but rarely during 
the period of the encaje. In fact, investment growth for smaller firms plummeted after the encaje 
was enacted, while simultaneously increasing for large firms. Moreover, around the time that the 
encaje was removed, investment growth fell for large firms and increased for smaller firms. 
Although none of the relationships depicted in the graphs controls for changes in investment 
                                                                                                                                                 
one category for the entire sample. Neither modification affects the key results, except that more stringent 
definitions for “small” firms increase estimates of financial constraints for small firms during the encaje.  
36 Information on stock issuance is only available for about ¼ of the sample. 
37 Secondary ADRs were not subject to the URR between 1991 and 1994, and thereby provided a relatively 
cheap and legal method of raising external financing. From 1995 until the encaje was lifted, however, 
secondary ADRs were subject to the same tax as other capital inflows, so that they were no longer more 
attractive than other sources of external financing. See Section II and Appendix A for further information.   19
opportunities or other factors that could affect firm-level investment, they do suggest that the 




V.  Estimation and Results  
This section performs more formal tests than the graphical trends reported above of how the 
encaje affected financing constraints for different-sized, publicly-traded firms in Chile. It begins 
by briefly discussing several econometric issues in estimating the models developed in Section 
III. Then it presents the base results, followed by an extensive series of sensitivity tests. The final 
part of this section repeats the base analysis for a set of additional emerging markets to test if the 
Chilean results are affected by any global factors.  
 
A. Econometric Issues and Estimation Methodology 
In order to estimate the q-based equation (9) and Euler-based equation (16), there are two 
problems with a simple OLS, fixed-effects, or random-effects estimator.
39 First, many of the 
variables in each of the estimating equations are likely to be jointly endogenous—i.e. either 
simultaneously determined with the dependent variable or subject to two-way causality. For 
example, in the q-based equations investment and q may be jointly determined by idiosyncratic 
technology shocks, or higher investment could in turn increase a company’s q value. Second, the 
presence of the lagged endogenous variable for investment will bias coefficient estimates. 
To control for these issues, I use a GMM-difference estimator developed by Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey and Rosen (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). This 
estimator first-differences each of the variables in order to eliminate the firm-specific effects, and 
then uses lagged levels of the variables as instruments.
40 Two critical assumptions must be 
                                                 
38 Work in progress by the author performs a more formal analysis of some of the graphical trends 
discussed in this section in an effort to explain how the encaje affected financing patterns for different 
types of firms. The remainder of this paper, however, only attempts to document whether the encaje 
increased financial constraints for different types of firms, and does not explore the channels by which any 
such effects occurred. 
39 See Beck and Levine (2002) for an excellent discussion of these econometric issues and the advantages 
and disadvantages of different panel-GMM estimators. 
40 A variant of this estimator is a “GMM-system” estimator developed in Arellano and Bover (1995). This 
technique estimates the equation in levels using first differences as instruments, as well as the equation in 
differences using lagged levels as instruments. This system estimator requires not only the two assumptions 
in equations (17) and (18), but also the additional assumption that there is no correlation between the 
differenced explanatory variables and the firm-specific effects. This additional assumption, however, is 
rejected in this paper’s dataset, as well as in Laeven (2002), which uses cross-country data to perform a 
similar analysis of firm-financing constraints using an Euler-equation model. Therefore, the GMM-system 
estimator is not valid for this paper’s tests.   20
satisfied for this estimator to be consistent and efficient. First, the explanatory variables must be 
predetermined by at least one period. Second, the error terms cannot be serially correlated (or at 
least must follow a moving average of finite order). More specifically, if Xit′ is the vector of 
explanatory variables in equations (9) or (16) and εit is the error term, then the two conditions are: 
 
 E(Xit′εis) = 0 for all s > t, and            (17) 
E(εit′εi,t-s) = 0 for all s ≥ 1.          ( 1 8 )  
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose two tests for the accuracy of this estimator. First, a 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the instruments and the residuals. Second, a test for different-order serial correlation in 
the residuals. If this test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation in the differenced equation, then the level variables lagged by one period are valid 
instruments. If there is evidence of second-order serial correlation, but not third-order (or higher) 
serial correlation, then the level variables lagged by two periods are valid instruments.  
One potential weakness of this GMM-difference estimator, which is discussed in 
Griliches and Hausman (1986), is that first differencing can exacerbate any bias resulting from 
measurement error. An additional potential problem is that the lagged levels of the variables can 
be weak instruments for the regression estimated in differences. This could not only increase the 
variance of the coefficient estimates, but in small samples, could also generate biased estimates. 
This problem is aggravated if the explanatory variables are persistent over time. Staiger and Stock 
(1997), however, suggest a method of testing if the lagged levels are weak instruments. They 
recommend regressing the first differences of each of the relevant variables on their instruments, 
with an F-statistic less than 5 indicating that the instruments are unreliable.
41   
An additional concern with this GMM estimator is that if there is no evidence of firm-
specific effects, it is more efficient to estimate the equation in levels (using lagged levels as 
instruments) instead of in first differences. There are two methods to test if the firm-specific 
effects should be included in the specification. First, estimate the model in levels and test for the 
presence of first-order serial correlation, which would indicate the presence of unobserved firm-
specific effects. Second, estimate the model in levels with firm-dummy variables and then test for 
the joint significance of the firm-dummy variables. 
                                                 
41 Carpenter and Petersen (2002) use this strategy to test if lagged levels are adequate instruments for first-
differenced equations in a similar analysis of firm-financing constraints. They suggest that an F-statistic 
greater than 10 indicates that the instruments are reliable.    21
A final consideration with the GMM-difference estimator is whether to focus on first-
stage or second-stage robust estimates. The two-stage estimates are more efficient asymptotically, 
but often generate standard errors that are biased downward (especially in small samples). As a 
result, the two-stage estimates are less accurate for hypothesis testing, and Arellano and Bond 
(1991) recommend focusing on the first-stage robust estimates.
42 Therefore, in the analysis below 
I focus on the first-stage robust estimates, although I continue to estimate each of the 
specifications using the two-stage robust estimates. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, using the 
two-stage robust estimates has no impact on the key results and conclusions, although it does tend 
to reduce the estimated standard errors as predicted. Therefore, focusing on the first-stage 
estimates is the more conservative set of hypothesis tests and should make it more difficult to find 
evidence of increased financing constraints for smaller firms during the encaje.  
 
B. Baseline Results for Chile 
Table 4 presents a series of initial results on the impact of the encaje on firm-financing 
constraints in Chile (without controlling for firm size). I focus on one-stage robust estimates that 
have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using a maximum of 3 lags for each of the explanatory 
variables as instruments.
43 Each of the explanatory variables is assumed to be predetermined 
instead of strictly exogenous (except the period dummy variables). Columns (1) and (2) report 
estimates of the Tobin’s q and Euler-equation models, respectively, for the full sample of Chilean 
firms during the entire sample period from 1988 through 2001. Columns (3) and (4) present 
results for the full sample during the period before the encaje was in place (from 1988-1991); 
columns (5) and (6) report results for the period of the encaje (from 1992-1997); and columns (7) 
and (8) present results after the encaje was lifted (from 1998-2001).
44 Variable definitions are the 
same as in Section IV and are described in detail in Table 3.
45 The period dummy variables are 
                                                 
42 Beck and Levine (2002) also make this point. 
43 I focus on estimates using only 3 lags instead of the full possible instrument matrix, because adding 
additional lags adds little explanatory power but weakens the power of the instruments. As shown in the 
sensitivity analysis, using fewer or additional lags has no significant impact on the results. 
44 The encaje was enacted in mid-1991 and removed in mid-1998. As shown in Appendix A, however, the 
encaje was implemented in phases and slowly phased out, so that it was substantially less stringent in 1991 
and 1998. Adopting this narrower definition of the encaje period also leads to a more balanced sample 
distribution across the different periods, thereby facilitating estimation, especially during the earlier period 
when sample size is limited. Moreover, if the encaje had strong effects in 1991 or 1998, then this narrower 
definition should bias results against finding any impact of the encaje on financing constraints. Finally, the 
sensitivity analysis explores the impact of using different period definitions.  
45 There is an active debate on whether cash stock or cash flow is a preferred measure of a firm’s liquidity. 
To be consistent with the most recent work in this literature (such as Harrison et al. (2001), Laeven (2002), 
and Love (2001)), I focus on cash stock for the base estimates. As discussed in the sensitivity analysis, the   22
not reported, but the row labeled “Period dummies” reports the Wald statistic of a test of the null 
hypothesis that the period dummy variables are jointly insignificant. The lower section of the 
table reports test statistics for the series of tests discussed in Section V.A. 
Focusing first on the coefficient estimates, the estimates for the financial constraints’ 
variables in Table 4 fluctuate between positive and negative and are never significant at the 5 
percent level. These results suggest that financing constraints were not important for the full 
sample of public Chilean firms during the periods before, during, and after the encaje. The other 
coefficient estimates generally support theoretical predictions. The coefficients on lagged 
investment and q or Sales are usually positive, with significance fluctuating across specifications. 
The period dummy variables also have fluctuating significance.  
The test statistics reported in Table 4 support the validity of the model specification and 
estimation technique. The Sargan test statistics indicate that in each case, it is impossible to reject 
the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
46 Although the test for serial 
correlation suggests that second-serial correlation may be a concern for estimates based on the 
full period, the tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation 
for most of the sub-periods. The only exception is the Euler-based estimates for the post-encaje 
period, but as discussed in the sensitivity analysis, addressing this by only using the appropriate 
higher-order lags as instruments has no significant impact on the key results. I also estimate 
regressions and the corresponding F-statistics for the explanatory variables to test the validity of 
the instruments. In each case, the F-statistic is greater than 5, and usually greater than 10, 
suggesting that the instruments are valid.
47 Finally, I estimate each model in levels (instead of 
first differences) to test if the firm-specific effects are significant. When I exclude the firm-
specific effects, tests indicate that there is first-order serial correlation for the equation in levels. 
When I include the firm-dummy variables, an F-test indicates that the firm-dummy variables are 
jointly significant.
48 Both results confirm that there are unobserved firm-specific effects and 
therefore the model should be estimated in differences instead of levels. 
Next, Table 5 repeats the same analysis as Table 4, but allows financial constraints to 
vary for different-sized firms, as specified in equations (9) and (16). More specifically, the top of 
                                                                                                                                                 
central results are unchanged if I replace Cash with a range of different measures of cash flow. See Love 
(2001) for an excellent discussion of why cash stock is a better proxy for Cash than cash flow.  
46 I focus on Sargan test statistics based on the two-stage estimates, since these are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity. Sargan test statistics based on one-step estimates (which assume homoscedasticity in the 
errors) yield similar results. The null hypothesis is never rejected in either set of tests.  
47 For example, for the encaje period, the F-statistic from the regression of the first difference of Cash on 
its instruments is 19.1 for the q-based equation and 19.5 for the Euler-based equation.  
48 For example, for the encaje period, the F-statistic from a test of the joint significance of the firm-dummy 
variables is F(65, 228)=68.7 for the q-based equation and F(65,235)=222.3 for the Euler-based equation.   23
the table includes an interaction term between Cash and a size dummy variable, with Size=1 for 
large firms.
49 The bottom of the table includes an interaction term between Cash and a continuous 
measure of firm size (Size), which is defined as ln(Assets). Therefore, the top of the table captures 
different financial constraints, on average, between small and large public firms, while the bottom 
of the table tests for any linear relationship between firm size and financial constraints.  
In both the top and bottom of Table 5, coefficient estimates for the financial constraints’ 
variables continue to be insignificant for the full period, suggesting that on average between 1988 
and 2001, neither small nor large publicly-traded firms were financially constrained. Estimates 
from the different sub-periods, however, suggest that this result masks important differences 
across time. During the period when the encaje was in place, the coefficients on Cash are positive 
and highly significant in both parts of the table, for both the Tobin’s q and Euler-equation 
specifications. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction between Cash and Size (measured as 
either the dummy variable or continuous variable) are negative and highly significant. These 
results indicate that during the encaje smaller public firms were significantly more financially 
constrained than larger firms on average, and that as firm size increased, these financial 
constraints decreased.  
As mentioned in Section III, however, there is extensive evidence that smaller firms tend 
to be more financially constrained than larger firms in a range of countries. The evidence 
presented in columns (5) and (6) only shows that smaller publicly-traded firms were more 
financially constrained than larger firms in Chile between 1992 and 1997, and does not 
necessarily indicate that the encaje aggravated these constraints. The results in the rest of Table 5, 
however, suggest that these differences in financial constraints between small and large publicly-
traded firms did not exist in the periods before and after the encaje. More specifically, in columns 
(7) and (8) there is no evidence of financial constraints for either smaller or large firms for the 
period after the encaje was lifted, nor any evidence of a significant relationship between firm size 
and financial constraints. The coefficient estimates from the period before the encaje (in columns 
(3) and (4)) should be interpreted more cautiously due to the small sample sizes. With this caveat, 
the coefficient estimates at the top of the table suggest that before the encaje, financial constraints 
for large firms may have been lower than for smaller firms, but that these constraints for smaller 
firms were insignificant. The bottom of the table finds no significant relationship between firm 
size and financial constraints before the encaje. Moreover, for both the Tobin’s q and Euler 
specifications in both parts of the table, the coefficients on Cash are significantly greater, and the 
                                                 
49 Large firms continue to be defined as having inflation-adjusted assets greater than 100 billion pesos (the 
same definition as used for the graphical analysis in Section IV).   24
coefficients on the interaction term are significantly less, during the encaje than either before or 
after.
50 This series of results suggests not only that smaller firms were more financially 
constrained than larger firms during the encaje, but also that smaller firms were more constrained 
during the encaje than either before or after the capital controls were in place. 
Not only are the estimated financial constraints for smaller firms during the encaje 
significant, but also the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates suggest that this effect is 
economically important. Focusing first on the top of the table with the estimates based on the Size 
dummy variables, an increase in a smaller firm’s cash-stock ratio by one standard deviation 
(0.426) during the encaje is correlated with an increase of about 34% to 44% in the firm’s 
investment ratio.
51 The same increase in a large firm’s cash-stock ratio during the encaje is 
correlated with a 4% to 13% increase in the firm’s investment ratio. The results at the bottom of 
Table 5, with Size measured by ln(Assets), support these large effects. For example, focusing on 
the smaller estimates from the Euler-based model, for a firm with assets of 133 million pesos (the 
sample mean less one-third the sample standard deviation), the same one standard deviation 
increase in the firm’s cash stock ratio would be correlated with a 26% increase in the firm’s 
investment ratio. If the firm was twice as large (based on assets), than the same increase in the 
firm’s cash stock ratio is correlated with a 13% increase in its investment ratio. Therefore, the 
estimates from both the top and bottom of Table 5 suggest that the impact of financial constraints 
on investment may have been economically important during the period of the encaje, and that 
these effects decreased rapidly as firm size increased. 
The other coefficient estimates in Table 5 follow the same general patterns as reported for 
the full sample of firms in Table 4. The test statistics also indicate that the model continues to 
satisfy each of the assumptions outlined in Section V.A. The only exception is the test for second-
order serial correlation for the estimates based on the entire period, and the Euler-equation 
estimates for the post-encaje period. Estimating this model using only higher-order lags as 
instruments (in order to satisfy the assumptions for serial correlation), however, has no significant 
impact on the results.  
                                                 
50 These results are based on two different testing strategies. First, I use a one-sided t-test to evaluate if the 
estimated coefficient is significantly greater (or less) during the encaje than the other period. Second, I 
estimate the model including both the encaje and the other relevant period, allowing all of the coefficients 
to vary across periods. Then I use a Wald test to compare the restricted model (when the coefficients on 
Cash and the interaction are restricted to be equal across periods) versus an unrestricted model. The key 
conclusion−that the constraints are significantly greater during the encaje−are identical using either test.  
51 For comparison, the sample mean and standard deviation for the investment ratio are 17% and 20%, 
respectively.   25
In order to further explore this section’s central result that financial constraints are 
significant for smaller, traded firms and decrease with firm size during the encaje, I perform an 
extension to this base analysis. I divide the sample of firms into 5 approximately equally-sized 
groups based on firm size (as measured by total assets) and then create a new size dummy 
variable for each quintile.
52 Then I estimate the Tobin’s q and Euler-equation models, including 
interaction terms between Cash and each of these size-quintile dummies. Although the degrees of 
freedom available for estimation during the pre-encaje period are limited, this approach provides 
more concrete evidence on whether financial constraints decrease linearly with firm size. This 
approach also provides an informal test of the validity of the testing framework used in this paper 
and addresses some of the concerns with this methodology discussed in Section III.
53  
The resulting coefficient estimates are reported in Table 6.
54 The estimates for the encaje 
period clearly suggest that as firm size increases, financial constraints decrease. In fact, for both 
the Tobin’s q and Euler-equation models, the estimated coefficient on Cash is largest for the 
quintile of smallest firms, decreases by about one-third for the medium-small quintile, and then 
continues to decrease as firm size increases, a relationship that is particularly striking for the 
Tobin’s q estimates. In both models the estimated coefficients on Cash are significant for the 
smallest two quintiles and insignificant for the largest two quintiles (with mixed results for the 
middle quintile). In sharp contrast to these results during the encaje, there is no pattern between 
financial constraints and firm size either before or after the encaje. The estimates during the pre-
encaje period indicate that larger firms may actually have been more financially constrained than 
smaller firms, although it is impossible to draw any strong conclusions due to the limited sample 
size. More striking, however, during the post-encaje period the coefficient on Cash is not 
significant for any of the size quintiles, and there is no trend between size quintiles and financial 
constraints. These results are supported by the formal tests summarized in the columns on the far 
right of the table. According to both one-sided t-tests and Wald tests, the coefficient on Cash is 
significantly greater during the encaje period than either before or after for the smallest and 
medium-small firms, but not for the medium-large and large firms (with mixed results for the 
middle quintile). 
                                                 
52 I divide the sample into equally-sized quintiles during the encaje period, and then use these divisions 
(inflation-adjusted) for each period in order to maintain consistent sizes for each quintile across periods. 
53 For example, if the estimated financial constraints increase with firm size based on these finer gradations, 
it is difficult to explain these results based on factors such as results being driven by firm characteristics 
other than size, or results being driven by shocks to profit opportunities that are not adequately captured in 
q or Sales and are instead incorporated in the coefficient on Cash.  
54 Each specification continues to satisfy the Sargan test and serial correlation test.   26
These results provide support for the testing framework used in this paper. Table 6 
suggests that the estimates are capturing relationships between internal finances and investment 
for different-sized firms, and not spurious relationships caused by correlations between Cash and 
other firm characteristics. These results also clearly indicate that any financial constraints 
resulting from the encaje decreased with firm size.  
 
C. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section discusses an extensive analysis of the robustness of the key results reported above. 
Given the extensive number of tests, I only report a small subset of these results, focusing on 
concerns that have been raised most often in the literature. Table 7 summarizes several tests, and 
to conserve space and emphasize the key results, only reports coefficient estimates for the 
relevant financial constraints’ variables for the Euler-equation model (although I continue to 
estimate the full model in equations (9) and (16) for each test). I focus on results when Cash is 
interacted with the dummy variable equal to 1 for large firms (as shown on the top of Table 5), 
although results when Cash is interacted with the continuous measure of firm size are equally 
robust.
55 The base results from Section V. B. are reported in column (1), and the sensitivity tests 
are divided into four groups: variable definitions, model specification, estimation methodology, 
and sample selection. 
I begin by testing if modifying the variable definitions has any significant impact on 
results. First, I use different measures of firm size, such as total sales or market value, and/or 
express each firm size variable in levels instead of logarithmic form. Second, I use different time 
periods to define the pre-encaje, encaje, and post-encaje periods. Column (2) only includes 1991-
94 as the “encaje”, while column (3) only includes the later period from 1995-97.
56 I also use a 
less stringent definition of the encaje, including 1991 and 1998 (years in which the encaje was 
either enacted or removed). Third, instead of using cash stock at the start of the period to measure 
financial constraints, I use several different definitions of cash flow. For example, I use operating 
income, net income before preferred dividends, net income before extraordinary items, and net 
income (all weighted by capital stock and either for the current period or lagged by one year). 
Column (4) reports estimates using lagged operating income to measure Cash. Fourth, instead of 
weighting each of the variables (except q) by the start-of-period capital stock, I weight each of the 
variables by the start-of-period assets. Fifth, and finally, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999) 
                                                 
55 See Forbes (2003) for results from a series of sensitivity tests when Cash is interacted with the 
continuous measure of firm size, using both the Tobin’s q and Euler-equation models. 
56 See Section II for more information on the strength and coverage of the encaje in different years.   27
suggest that the marginal profit of capital (MPK) can be defined based on operating profits 
instead of sales (as in equation (15)).
57 I estimate the model using this alternative definition.  
The next series of sensitivity tests examines the impact of altering the model 
specification. First, I follow a number of papers in this literature by adding different measures of 
leverage to equations (9) or (16).
58 Column (5) of Table 7 reports results when leverage is 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Second, since the significance of the period-
dummy variables fluctuates across specifications, I exclude the period dummies. Third, since 
there is no reason to expect the relationship between financial constraints and firm size to be 
linear, I experiment with squared and cubed interaction terms. Column (6) reports results when I 
include a squared interaction. In each case, the additional terms are insignificant and do not 
improve the equations’ fit. Fourth, I follow several papers in this literature by including an 
accelerator term for investment. More specifically, column (7) reports results when I add a term 
measuring sales growth (weighted by capital).
59 Fifth, I respecify the models using the growth in 
the investment ratio instead of the level of the investment ratio as the dependent variable. Finally, 
in order to test for any effect of business cycle fluctuations on financial constraints, I add a 
variable interacting GDP growth with Cash.
60 Results are reported in Column (8). 
As an additional series of sensitivity tests, I examine the impact of using alternate 
estimation methodologies and assumptions. First, I re-estimate the model using fixed effects or 
random effects, both with and without the lagged term for investment. Column (9) reports results 
using fixed effects (without the lagged term for investment, which causes biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates under fixed effects). Second, I use different lag structures. Instead of using a 
maximum of 3 lags for each of the explanatory variables, I use only 1 lag, a maximum of 2, 4, or 
5 lags, or as many lags as are available. I also re-estimate the model using only variables that 
have been lagged by two periods or more (instead of 1 period or more) in order to avoid any bias 
resulting from any second-order serial correlation. Third, I try using a broader set of variables as 
instruments. For example, I follow Love (2001) and use lagged values of the operating-profit 
definition of MPK and cash flow (weighted by the capital stock) as additional instruments. I also 
                                                 
57 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999), as well as Love (2001), argue that the sales-based measure of MPK is 
better than the operating-profit based measure because the operating-profit measure assumes that there are 
no fixed costs or quasi-fixed factors of production (other than capital). The sales-based measure of MPK 
allows for fixed costs and additional quasi-fixed factors of production, although it requires an additional 
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
58 Lang et al (1996) argue that leverage can be more important than cash flow in determining investment.  
59 See Gelos and Werner (2001) or Harris et al (1994) for examples of accelerator models used to estimate 
investment equations. 
60 GDP growth is calculated as log differences of annual inflation-adjusted GDP, based on lines 
22899B.PXF and 22899B.PWF of IMF(2002).   28
include sales (weighted by capital) as an instrument in the Tobin’s q equation and/or leverage as 
an additional instrument in both equations. Column (10) reports results using the full set of 
additional instruments. Fourth, column (11) reports estimates of the base model using the two-
stage robust estimator, which tends to understate standard errors and therefore overstate 
coefficient significance. Finally, I alter my assumptions about whether the explanatory variables 
other than Cash and its interactions are constrained to remain constant across periods and size 
groups.
61 For example, Table 8 reports results when I estimate separate equations for each period 
and size group, thereby allowing all coefficients to vary across periods and small/large firms. I 
also estimate a model constraining all of the explanatory variables other than Cash and its 
interactions to remain constant across periods and size groups. 
As a final series of sensitivity tests, I explore the impact of sample selection and 
removing outliers. I remove one industry group at a time (based on Table 2), one firm at a time, 
and one year at a time. I also include the observations that were excluded as outliers or 
“unrealistic” variables (as described in Appendix B) as well as exclude the five extreme outliers 
for each differenced variable. Next, I exclude all “non-traditional companies”, such as several 
sporting clubs, hospitals, and educational facilities, for which the standard accounting variables 
may be less informative.
62 Finally, I create several more balanced panels. More specifically, I 
only include firms with data for every year from 1988-2001, from 1991-2000, or from 1990-
1998. The later division is designed to maximize the number of observations but include the same 
set of firms in each of the time periods. These final results are reported in column (12) of Table 7. 
This series of sensitivity tests reported in Tables 7 through 8 suggests that the key results 
reported in Section V.B are highly robust to a range of variable definitions, model specifications, 
estimation methodologies, and sample selection. In every single test during the encaje, the 
coefficient estimates on Cash are positive and significant (always at the 10 percent level and 
usually at the five percent level), while the coefficients on the interaction term are negative and 
significant. In sharp contrast, during the pre-encaje and post-encaje period the coefficients on 
Cash are rarely positive and significant, and the coefficients on the interaction term have 
fluctuating signs and significance (and are always insignificant in the post-encaje period). One of 
                                                 
61 In the main estimates, I constrain the explanatory variables other than Cash and its interactions to be 
equal for small and large firms in each period, but allow them to vary across periods. I focus on this 
specification because it most closely follows the model developed in equations (9) and (16), which 
constrains the additional explanatory variables to be constant across size groups, while not imposing any 
additional constraints across periods. Estimates modifying these assumptions do not change the central 
conclusions. Moreover, the estimates in Table 5 suggest that the coefficients other than the financial 
constraints variables may fluctuate across periods.  
62 Thanks to Francisco Gallego for raising this concern.   29
the few exceptions to these patterns is when the “encaje” period is only defined to include 1991-
94 or 1995-97. Although the coefficient signs still follow the above patterns, the estimates in 
columns (2) and (3) suggest that the impact of the encaje on financing constraints for smaller 
firms may have been greater during the first half of this period (a result supported by the 
graphical evidence on investment growth in Figure 6). Finally, one-sided t-tests and Wald tests 
indicate that in every specification (except when the encaje is defined as lasting from 1995-97), 
the coefficient on Cash is significantly greater, and on the interaction coefficient is significantly 
less, during the encaje than in the other periods. 
 
D. Evidence from Other Emerging Markets 
One concern with the results reported in Tables 5-8 is that the evidence of greater financial 
constraints for smaller, publicly-traded Chilean firms during the mid-1990’s could be driven by 
factors other than the encaje. For example, the series of financial crises starting in Mexico in 
1994 and moving to Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998 could have reduced investor demand for 
investment in smaller, less well-known firms in emerging markets. Or, the growth and 
development of Chilean financial markets during the 1990’s could have differentially affected 
small and large firms (although, this effect would a priori be expected to reduce, instead of 
increase, relative financial constraints for small firms). Although the time-series nature of this 
paper’s analysis makes it impossible to control for all Chilean domestic events that occurred 
simultaneously with the encaje, it is possible to examine changes in financial constraints in other 
countries to assess whether changes in the global environment are driving the central results. 
  To perform this analysis, I use the Worldscope database to compile a dataset identical to 
that described in Section IV and Appendix B for a set of emerging markets “comparable” to Chile 
(based on geographic location, income per capita, credit ratings, and investor assessments). 
Unfortunately, Worldscope coverage is extremely limited for many of these countries, especially 
before 1995, restricting the sample of countries that can be included in the analysis. The resulting 
dataset includes information for several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico), several Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan), and several Eastern 
European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Table 9 reports the sample’s 
distribution across countries and periods.  
  Table 10 reports estimates of the financial constraints’ coefficients in equations (9) and 
(16) for different groups of non-Chilean emerging markets. More specifically, it reports the 
coefficients for Cash and an interaction between Cash and a dummy variable equal to one for   30
large firms.
63 The left side of the table reports estimates for Brazil, Mexico and Singapore, and 
the right side of the table reports estimates for an unweighted Latin American index, Asian index, 
and an index including all 10 emerging markets. Although coefficient estimates vary significantly 
across countries/indices and periods, there is no evidence of patterns similar to those in Chile 
reported in Tables 5-8. More specifically, during the encaje period, there is not a single case in 
which the coefficient on Cash is positive and significant (at the five percent level) or the 
interaction term is negative and significant.  
  Some of the patterns reported in Table 10 (such as the significant coefficients for 
Singapore after 1997) could be caused by the series of crises in emerging markets during the 
1990’s. Interpreting each of these coefficients is beyond the scope of this paper, but nonetheless, 
the table suggests that the evidence of increased financial constraints for smaller, publicly-traded 
Chilean firms during the encaje can not be explained by any global shocks or changes in the 
external environment that affected comparable emerging markets over this period. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
Managers of small and medium-sized firms in Chile argued that the encaje made it more difficult 
to obtain capital to fund productive investment. Despite the attention paid to the macroeconomic 
impact of the encaje, there was no empirical evidence supporting or refuting these arguments. 
The results in this paper, however, suggest that these complaints were justified. Smaller, publicly-
traded Chilean firms appear to have experienced significant financial constraints during the 
period that the encaje was in place, but not before or after. Large Chilean firms do not appear to 
have experienced significant financial constraints before, during or after the encaje. Moreover, 
during the period of the encaje, there appears to be a strong, linear, inverse relationship between a 
firm’s size and its degree of financial constraints.  
These conclusions, however, are subject to several caveats. The sample of firms for the 
period before the encaje is fairly small. The dataset only includes publicly-listed firms, so that the 
results may not apply to a broader set of private companies. The estimates are based on linear 
normalizations of economic relationships that may be nonlinear. Many of the variables are 
imperfect measures of the underlying economic concept (such as average q to measure marginal q 
or sales to capture the marginal profit of capital). The GMM estimation technique may not fully 
                                                 
63 The cutoff for large firms is based on inflation-adjusted assets and is the U.S. dollar equivalent of the 
cutoff used for Chile. Results are similar if the interaction term includes a continuous variable, instead of a 
dummy, for Size.   31
account for joint endogeneity. Most important, firms are defined as being financially constrained 
if their investment is significantly affected by their cash stocks (or cash flows), after controlling 
for future expected profitability. Although this strategy to test for financial constraints has been 
widely used, there is still an active debate on the accuracy of this definition and testing strategy.  
In order to address as many of these caveats as possible, this paper performs an extensive 
series of sensitivity tests. It examines the impact of modifying variable definitions, model 
specification, estimation methodology, and sample selection. It also uses two different modeling 
frameworks (a Tobin’s q and Euler-equation methodology) to perform each of the tests. The main 
results are highly robust to each of these variations. The paper also repeats this analysis for a 
sample of additional emerging markets to see if the results are driven by changes in the global 
environment instead of domestic events in Chile. None of the other countries shows evidence of 
increased financial constraints for smaller, publicly-traded firms during the period from 1992-97, 
indicating that the Chilean results were not driven by external factors. 
The consistency and strength of these results is particularly striking given three factors 
that could either bias the empirical tests against finding evidence of financial constraints for 
smaller Chilean firms during the encaje, or at least counteract any such impact. First, the database 
used for this analysis does not include the smallest firms in the Chilean economy, and even 
under-represents the smallest publicly-traded firms. The coefficient estimates of a highly 
significant, negative interaction term between Cash and a continuous measure of firm size during 
the encaje indicate a strong negative relationship between financial constraints and firm size. 
These results are supported by the estimates based on size quintiles in Table 6. Therefore, a more 
representative sample including more of the smallest firms in Chile—either public or private—
could yield even greater estimates of financial constraints for “smaller” firms.
64  
A second factor that would be expected to reduce estimates of the impact of the encaje on 
smaller firms’ financial constraints is the liberalization and growth of Chilean financial markets. 
As described in Gallego and Loayza (2000), financial market reforms led to the substantial 
development and deepening of Chilean financial markets in the first half of the 1990’s (as 
compared to the later half of the 1980’s). This development of domestic capital markets would be 
expected to not only decrease financial constraints for all firms, but to decrease financial 
constraints for smaller firms relatively more than for large firms (since small firms tend to be 
more financially constrained than larger firms in less developed financial markets).
65 Although 
                                                 
64 On the other hand, the smallest private firms may be entirely reliant on internal finances or local banks 
for external financing during all periods, and therefore be less affected by the encaje than small publicly-
traded firms or medium-sized private firms. 
65 For evidence, see Love (2001) or Laeven (2002).   32
the period dummy variables may capture any reduction in financing constraints for firms on 
average, this development of Chilean financial markets during the 1990’s could counteract any 
increase in financial constraints for smaller firms relative to large firms from the encaje.  
A final factor that could counteract any impact of the encaje on financial constraints for 
smaller firms is the contraction in lending to emerging markets that occurred during 1998 as a 
result of the Russian crisis and problems in Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). Capital 
flows into Chile declined dramatically in 1998, and peso-borrowing rates rose. These factors 
would be expected to increase financial constraints for Chilean firms, especially for smaller firms. 
Since 1998 is included in the post-encaje period, these effects could counteract any reduction in 
financing constraints for smaller Chilean firms that resulted from the removal of the encaje.  
Despite these three factors that would be expected to reduce estimates of any impact of 
the encaje on smaller firms’ financial constraints, this paper still finds strong and robust evidence 
that the Chilean capital controls significantly increased financial constraints for smaller, publicly-
traded firms, and that these constraints decreased with firm size. These results have important 
implications for the debate on the reform of the international financial architecture and the 
desirability of implementing taxes on capital inflows. Although other work suggests that the 
Chilean encaje might have generated some macroeconomic benefits, there has been no empirical 
evidence of any substantial cost to this policy. This paper suggests, however, that the encaje had 
the negative effect of increasing financial constraints for small and medium-sized, publicly-traded 
firms. This cost could be particularly important for emerging economies in which small firms are 
valuable engines of job creation and economic growth. As result, before countries adopt any 
Chilean-style tax on capital inflows, they should carefully weigh the potential benefits against the 
negative effects on investment and growth of smaller firms.   33
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Appendix A: A History of the Encaje
66 
 
June 1991: The unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) was established. 20% of capital 
inflows were to be deposited at the central bank in a non-interest bearing, unremunerated account 
denominated in the currency of the credit. The holding period was equal to the loan maturity with 
a minimum of 90 days and a maximum of 1 year. Borrowers could alternatively opt to pay an 
upfront fee (a promissory note at a discounted repurchase priced at LIBOR). The URR applied to 
all new foreign borrowing (by banks as well as non-financial institutions) and excluded trade 
credit (as long as shipment occurred within the next 6 months).  
 
July 1991: The URR was extended to include the renewals of all borrowings (still excluding 
trade credits), as well as any credits linked to FDI projects. 
 
January 1992: The URR was extended to include foreign currency deposits in commercial banks 
(held by domestic or foreign residents). The length of the URR for banks was also extended to 
equal the length of time that a deposit was in place.  
 
May 1992: The URR was raised to 30% and extended to a minimum of 1 year (regardless of the 
maturity of the loan). The increase of the rate to 30% did not initially apply to direct borrowing 
by corporations, for which the URR stayed at 20%. 
 
August 1992: The above exception for direct borrowing by corporations was removed (so that 
the URR for this type of borrowing also rose to 30%). The discount rate on the paid up-front fee 
was raised to LIBOR +2.5%. 
 
October 1992: The discount rate on the paid up-front fee was raised to LIBOR +4.0%. 
 
October 1993: The trade-credit exemption from the URR is extended to include trade credit if 
the merchandise is shipped within 300 days. This enlarged the trade-credit loophole. 
 
November 1994: An announcement that starting in January 1995, the URR deposits and 
equivalent up-front fee can only be paid in dollars. This substantially increased the implicit cost 
of the URR. 
 
July 1995: The URR was extended to include secondary ADRs (since these were no longer 
considered as FDI) and other inward financial instruments. Primary ADRs were still excluded 
from the URR (since they were viewed as capital additions). 
 
September 1995: The period to purchase foreign exchange after selling ADRs in the domestic 
market was shortened to 5 days. (There was previously no regulation of foreigners selling stock 
holdings in the domestic market and then taking the proceeds out of the country.) 
 
December 1995: New foreign borrowing to repay old debt (when the new loan is of equal or 
shorter maturity than the outstanding loan) was exempted from the URR. 
 
May 1996: The URR was extended to cover “speculative FDI”. FDI is considered non-
speculative, and therefore exempt from the URR, if it “increases productive capacity”. An FDI 
committee decides whether FDI is speculative.  
 
June 1996: Foreign credits can no longer be rolled over more than once a year. 
 
December 1996: Small foreign borrowing (less than US$ 200,000 per loan or less than US$ 
500,000 per year) became exempt from the URR. 
 
                                                 
66 Sources: Based on Ariyoshi et al (2000, Table 1 in Appendix I), Gallego et al (1999, Annex 2), and 
Simone and Sorsa (1999, Table 1). 
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Appendix A: A History of the Encaje (continued) 
 
March 1997: The above exemption for small foreign borrowing was reduced to less than US$ 
100,000 per year (cumulative). 
 
April 1997: The remittance of funds (principal and profits) from investments by Chileans abroad 
were exempt from the URR. 
 
September 1997: Proceeds from closing positions in derivatives/options in foreign markets by 
Chileans were exempt from the URR. 
 
June 1998: The URR was reduced to 10%, except for short-term credit lines and foreign-
currency denominated deposits, which remained at existing rates. 
 
August 1998: The URR was eliminated for secondary ADRs. 
 
September 1998: The URR was reduced to 0% for all capital inflows. Foreign investors were 









Appendix B: Creation of the Data Set 
 
The data set used in this paper was created in several steps: 
 
1.  Compile information for all Chilean firms included on the September 2002 Worldscope CD-
ROM. Data reported for a maximum of 10 years ending with the latest annual report. 
 
2.  Augment dataset with historical information from the May 1999 CD-ROM. Additional data is 
only included if the historical time series is consistent across the two sources. 
 
3.  Exclude all financial companies, defined as having a 1-digit SIC code of 6. 
 
4.  Exclude any companies that do not have information for at least 1 year for the 3 key variables 
necessary to estimate equation (9) or (16) – investment, cash stock, and capital stock. This 
leads to 1 additional exclusion (Marbella Country Club). 
 
5.  Exclude outliers and unrealistic observations for the variables used to estimate the base 
specifications for equations (9) or (16). More specifically, exclude individual observations 
where: 
  K ≤ 0 (10 observations) 
  I/K < 0 or I/K > 3 (6 observations) 
  q < 0 or q > 10 (1 observation) 
  Cash/K < 0 or Cash/K > 10 (7 observations) 




Cost of the Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) 
 
 
  Cost in % per year
1 






1991 1.5  1.5  1.5 
1992 (Jan-Apr)
2 1.1  1.1  1.1 
1992 (May-Dec)
2 7.7  3.9  1.9 
1993 6.9  3.4  1.7 
1994 9.4  4.7  2.4 
1995 10.3  5.1  2.6 
1996 9.4  4.7  2.4 
1997 9.4  4.7  2.4 
 
Notes:    
(1) In each year, the approximate cost of the URR tax rate (as a percent of loanable funds) is calculated 
using the equation: 
D
r T s i r
t
) 1 /( ) * ( + +
= , where t is the implied tax rate, r is the URR rate, i* is the nominal 
interest rate for the currency in which the URR is constituted, s is the premium applied to the investor when 
borrowing funds to cover the URR (i.e. the country risk premium plus specific credit risks for the investor), 
T is the duration of the URR, and D is the duration of the foreign investment. 
 
(2) The division for 1992 represents changes in the duration of the URR from between 3 months and 1 year 
(based on the maturity of the loan) to a minimum of 1 year. 
 
Source: From Ariyoshi et al (2000), Box 4 in Appendix I. 
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Table 2: Sample Information for Chilean Firms 
 
Number of firms
1  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Food/tobacco  5  5  5  9  10 11 12 15 16 18 23 30 27 26 
Petroleum  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Consumer  durables  1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 6 9 7 6 
Textiles/trade  1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 9  14  14  14 
Basic  industry/capital  goods  3  3  5  10 10 12 13 13 14 15 18 32 29 24 
Construction  2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 9 9 9  11  11  7 
Transportation  1 1 1 3 4 3 4 6 6 6 6 9 7 7 
Utilities  6  8  8  12 14 14 16 17 18 18 24 28 29 24 
Services  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 7 6 
Leisure  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 7 6 
This paper’s sample  19  22  25  41  46  49  56  63  69  74  99  147  138  120 
                
Financial  &  excluded  companies    2  2  2  4  9  10 12 14 19 21 29 44 38 31 
Total  firms  in  Worldscope  21 24 27 45 55 59 68 77 88 95  128  191  176  151 
Listed firms in Chile
2  205 213 215 221 245 263 279 284 283 295 287 285 258 249 
Worldscope as % of listed firms  10%  11%  13%  20%  22%  22%  24%  27%  31%  32%  45%  67%  68%  61% 
                
Total market capitalization (in billions of pesos)
3            
This  paper’s  sample  0.8  1.5  2.6  6.7  8.7  14.2 19.5 20.5 19.3 22.1 17.2 26.8 26.6 25.8 
Full  Worldscope  sample  0.8  1.6  2.7  6.7  8.8  14.5 20.4 21.9 21.6 26.2 20.4 34.0 33.7 33.2 
Total Chilean market
2  1.7  2.8  4.6  10.5 11.3 19.2 27.3 30.0 28.0 31.6 24.5 36.1 34.7 37.2 
Worldscope as % of total market  45%  56%  58%  64%  78%  76%  75%  73%  77%  83%  83%  94%  97%  89% 
 
Notes:   (1) SIC industry definitions are based on two-digit SIC groups defined in Campbell (1996). The only two changes are: the addition of several two-digit 
codes (which were not included anywhere in Campbell (1996)) to pre-specified groups; and combining basic industry with capital goods (which only had 1 
company).  More specifically, SIC codes for each group are: Food/tobacco (1, 2, 7, 9, 20, 21, 54); Petroleum (13, 29); Consumer durables (25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 
55, 57); Textiles/trade (22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59); Basic industry/capital goods (8, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33-35, 38); Construction (15-17, 32, 52); Transportation 
(40-42, 44, 45, 47); Utilities (46, 48, 49); Services (72, 73, 75, 76, 80-82, 87, 89); Leisure (27, 58, 70, 78, 79, 83-86, 88); and Financial (60-69). 
(2) All companies listed on the Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago. Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1996 and Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 2000. 
(3) Market capitalization calculated as of 12/31 in current year. 
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Table 3: Variable Definitions
1 
 
Variable Code  Definition 
Assets (total)    Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, and net property, 
plant, and equipment. Adjusted for inflation. Calculated at start-
of-period. Expressed in logarithmic form in regressions. 
Capital stock  K  Property, plant, and equipment (net of depreciation) at the end of 
the period, less investment (defined below), plus depreciation 
and amortization expenses. Calculated at start-of-period.  
Cash flow    Operating income, which is defined as total sales and revenues 
less operating expenses. Weighted by K in regressions. 
Cash stock  Cash  Cash and equivalents, which is money available for use in 
normal operations, including short-term investments. Weighted 
by K in regressions. Calculated at start-of-period. 
Debt (total)    All interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. The book 





I  Funds used to acquire fixed assets, other than those associated 
with acquisitions. Weighted by K in regressions. 
Leverage   The ratio of total debt (defined above) to total assets (defined 
above). Calculated at start-of-period. 
Market Value (or 
market 
capitalization) 
  Market price at year-end multiplied by common shares 
outstanding. For companies with more than one type of 
common/ordinary share, market value represents the total 
market value of the company. 
Sales (net)  Sales  Gross sales and other operating revenues less discounts, returns 
and allowances. Weighted by K in regressions. 
Short-term debt    The portion of debt payable within one year, including the 
current portion of long-term debt and sinking fund requirements 
of preferred stock or debentures. Calculated at start-of-period. 
Stock Issuance    Proceeds from the sale or issuance of stock over the past year. 
Tobin’s q  q  Defined as total debt (defined above) plus total market value 
(defined above) divided by the book value of total assets 
(defined above). Calculated at start-of-period. 
 
 
Notes:   (1)   All variables calculated in Chilean pesos. 
(2)  Given the limited time series information available for many companies, it is impossible to 
use an iterative technique to estimate the replacement value of capital for the denominator of 
q. Due to the complications in calculating this replacement value, the use of the book value of 
total assets has become fairly common. Moreover, Perfect and Wiles (1994) show that the 
improvement in the measurement of q from more complicated calculations is limited, 
especially when the regression analysis includes firm-fixed effects.   41
Table 4 
Base Results: No Controls for Firm Size 
 
  Full Period (1988-2001)    Pre-Encaje (1988-1991)    Encaje (1992-1997)    Post-Encaje (1998-2001) 


































































                   
Period dummies
1 31.9**  14.8   9.9**  2.5  6.6  3.8  4.9  6.5 
                      
# observations  562  594    30  38    252  262    280  294 
# firms 
 
109 114    16  20    61  61    108 113 
Sargan test
2 73.6  75.2    10.1  14.2    54.0  58.1    47.5  47.2 
Serial correlation
3 -1.9*  -2.4**    -1.1  0.5  -1.5  -1.4  -1.0  -2.4** 
 
Notes: * is significant at the 10 percent level and ** is significant at the 5 percent level. “Tobin’s q” are the q-based estimates in equation (9). “Euler” are the 
Euler-equation based estimates in equation (16). Neither equation, however, includes the interaction between Cash and Size. 
(1) Period dummies is the Wald statistic of a test of the null hypothesis that the period dummy variables are jointly insignificant.  
(2) Sargan test is the χ
2 statistic of a test of the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Statistics are based on the two-step estimator, so 
that the test is adjusted for heteroscedasticity.  
(3) Serial correlation is the Z-statistic from a test of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the residuals.    42
Table 5: Base Results: Cash Stock Interacted with Firm Size 
 




















































































1 31.2**  14.1    38.6**  5.4   7.3  3.4    3.9  7.1 
# observations  562  594    30  38    252  262    280  294 
# firms  109  114    16  20    61  61    108  113 
Sargan test
2 77.7  75.2    10.9  12.4    51.1  50.6    65.0  66.2 
Serial correlation
3 -2.0*  -2.4**   -1.1  0.4  -0.9  -0.7   -1.0  -2.1** 
                      


































































1  29.4** 13.9    9.4** 2.7    3.2  5.3    5.3** 7.1 
# observations  562  594    30  38    252  262    280  294 
# firms  109  114    16  20    61  61    108  113 
Sargan test
2 74.1  78.5    9.7  14.6    54.6  54.4    67.7  62.9 
Serial correlation
3 -1.9*  -2.4**   -0.9  0.4  -1.0  -0.8   -1.0  -2.1** 
 
Notes: Top of table includes an interaction term between Cash and a size dummy variable equal to 1 for large firms. Large firms defined as having inflation-adjusted assets greater 
than 100 billion pesos. Bottom of table includes an interaction between Cash and ln (Assets).* is significant at the 10 percent level and ** is significant at the 5 percent level. 
“Tobin’s q” are the q-based estimates in equation (9). “Euler” are the Euler-equation based estimates in equation (16). See notes to table 4 for numbered footnotes.   43
Table 6: Financial Constraints for Quintiles of Different-Sized Firms 
 
 
      Is Coefficient Significantly 












 Pre-encaje   Post-encaje 
    q  Euler   q  Euler   q  Euler    q  Euler    q  Euler 
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# observations    47  58  252  262  280  294           
# firms    18 21    61  61    108 113             
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at the 10% level and ** is significant at the 5% level. “q” represents Tobin’s q-based equation (9) and “Euler” is Euler-based 
equation (16). Cash is interacted with dummy variables for firm size quintiles. Firm size is measured by total assets in billions of inflation-adjusted pesos. Quintile divisions are 
based on sample distribution during the encaje, and then divisions are held constant across periods. Regression includes period dummy variables (not reported). 
(1) Pre-encaje period extended through 1993 in order to have sufficient degrees of freedom for meaningful estimation. 
(2) Summary result of both a one-sided t-test and a Wald test if the estimated coefficient on the cash interaction is significantly greater during the encaje than the other period. “Y” 
denotes yes (according to both tests)  and “N” denotes no. Stars continue to indicate degree of significance. 
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Pre-encaje  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12) 
Cash  -0.149 0.728** 0.565*  0.381  -0.055  0.077  -0.146 -0.260  -0.132 -0.134  -0.348**  -0.149 
  (0.179) (0.270) (0.321) (0.242) (0.181) (0.154)  (0.179)  (0.328) (0.208)  (0.186)  (0.174) (0.179) 
Interaction  -0.357** -0.352** -0.757**  -0.072  -0.307**  0.517  -0.382** -0.300**  -0.090  -0.287** -0.372**  -0.357**
  (0.087) (0.122) (0.225) (0.064) (0.147) (0.315)  (0.089)  (0.110) (0.175)  (0.117)  (0.050) (0.087) 
Encaje                  
Cash  0.797** 0.969**  0.350* 0.642** 0.808** 0.804**  0.740**  0.528*  0.316** 0.828** 0.808**  0.944** 
  (0.300) (0.441) (0.192) (0.317) (0.299) (0.295)  (0.286)  (0.307) (0.093)  (0.287)  (0.009) (0.354) 
Interaction  -0.713** -1.172** -0.271** -0.621** -0.707**  -0.723** -0.717** -0.757** -0.170*  -0.730** -0.725**  -0.776**
  (0.282) (0.404) (0.134) (0.317) (0.279) (0.277)  (0.260)  (0.281) (0.096)  (0.273)  (0.007) (0.343) 
Post-Encaje                  
Cash  -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 0.003 -0.011 -0.007  -0.203 -0.058  -0.095 -0.013  0.002  -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.005) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.162)  (0.052) (0.058)  (0.020)  (0.008) (0.055) 
Interaction  0.023 0.000 0.023  -0.006  0.052 0.130  0.209  0.082 0.102  0.009  0.010 0.012 
  (0.038) (0.026) (0.038) (0.010) (0.054) (0.112)  (0.154)  (0.078) (0.062)  (0.025)  (0.009) (0.056) 
 
 
Notes “Euler” estimates from equation (16). The interaction term is the coefficient on the interaction between Cash and Size, with Size equal to 1 for large firms. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Throughout the table, * denotes significance at the 10 percent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
(1)  Base estimates, with full results reported at the top of Table 5. 
(2) Redefine  encaje as period from 1991-94. Years from 1995-97 included in the post-encaje period. 1991 no longer included in pre-encaje period. 
(3) Redefine  encaje period to focus on the later period from 1995-97. Years from 1991-94 included in the pre-encaje period. 
(4)  Financial constraints redefined as lagged cash flow instead of cash stock. Cash flow defined in Table 3. 
(5)  Add an additional variable controlling for leverage to each of the specifications. Leverage defined in Table 3. 
(6)  Include a squared interaction between Cash and Size. Coefficient estimates on the squared term are not reported but are highly insignificant. 
(7)  Include accelerator variables, measured by sales growth (over the start-of-period capital stock).  
(8)  To control for business cycle effects, add a control variable that is an interaction between GDP growth and Cash. 
(9)  Model estimated using fixed effects (with no instruments). Lagged term for investment is excluded. 
(10) Model estimated with additional instruments: cash flow (weighted by capital stock), leverage, and the operating profit definition of MPK.  
(11) Model estimated using the two-stage robust estimator. 
(12) Sample restricted to a balanced panel including only companies with data for every year from 1990 through 1998 (so the sample of firms is constant 









1    Encaje   Post-encaje 
Small Firms  q Euler    q Euler    q Euler 












               












               












                
# obs  18  25    93  102    106  119 
                
Large Firms               












               












               












                
# obs  62  68    159  160    174  175 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *  and ** are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. “q” is equation (9) and “Euler” is equation (16).  
Period dummy variables are included but not reported. Estimate model separately for large and small firms in each period, excluding the Cash*Size interaction. 
(1) Pre-encaje period extended through 1993 in order to have sufficient degrees of freedom for estimation.   46
 
Table 9 
Number of Firms in Non-Chilean Emerging Market Sample 
 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
                
Argentina  0  0  3  2  4  7  13 15 18 22 24 25 26 27 
Brazil  0  0  0  1  8  57 59 72 92 83 96  108  177  158 
Mexico  1  9  10 14 21 35 41 44 48 52 60 70 75 38 
Latin America index
1  1  9  13  17  33  99  113 131 158 157 180 203 278 223 
                
Korea  0 2 4 2 4 1 5  20  15  13  13  46  117  129 
Malaysia  0  5  28  32  65  92  96  117 175 215 243 226 232 257 
Singapore  0  9  24 26 43 52 57 75  101  112  122  135  138  173 
Taiwan  0  2  1  1  14  18  29  65  127 141 149 148 202 196 
Asia index
2  0  18  57  61  126 163 187 277 418 481 527 555 689 755 
                
Czech  Republic  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4  22  18  23  17  7 
Hungary  0 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 7 7 5  14  17  10 
Poland  0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 9 9  13  9  12  11 
                
Emerging Market Index
3  1  27  70  78  159 267 306 416 596 676 743 804  1013  1006 
 
Notes:  (1) Includes Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
(2) Includes Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
(3) Includes all 10 countries listed in table.   47
Table 10: Financial Constraints in Other Countries and Regions 
 
 
  Brazil   Mexico  Singapore    Latin  America
1   Asia
2 Emerging  Markets
3
  q Euler    q Euler  q Euler  q  Euler  q Euler  q Euler 
Pre-encaje
4  (1) (2)    (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   Cash   -21.20  -4.47  -0.79  -0.63**  0.80*  0.27  -1.78**  -1.31*  1.22**  0.76  1.22**  0.77 
      (19.72)  (5.94)    (0.56) (0.31)  (0.41) (0.29)  (0.66)  (0.69)  (0.61) (0.60)  (0.62) (0.60) 
   Cash*Size  21.54  8.58    0.97*  0.58*  1.29 0.90  1.95**  1.34*  0.95 0.90  0.85 0.85 
  (18.76)  (7.88)    (0.54) (0.33)  (1.01) (0.92)  (0.67)  (0.71)  (0.83) (0.96)  (0.87) (0.92) 
   # obs.  62  64    83  90  141  159  159  174  382  423  545  602 
                      
Encaje                      
   Cash   -0.28 0.01    0.03 -0.02  1.38* 0.85  -0.19  -0.05  0.60 0.35  0.61 0.37 
      (0.27) (0.32)    (0.17) (0.04)  (0.77) (0.68)  (0.26)  (0.07)  (0.46) (0.35)  (0.46) (0.36) 
   Cash*Size  0.41 -0.00    0.25  0.09  0.32  0.53  0.44 0.13  -0.08 -0.36  -0.06 -0.38 
  (0.27) (0.34)    (0.19) (0.12)  (0.68) (0.59)  (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.41) (0.35)  (0.39) (0.36) 
   # obs.  255  263    184  200  327  356  492  525  1133  1221  1651  1777 
                      
Post-encaje                      
   Cash   0.16 -0.15    0.05 0.15  0.79**  0.76**  0.19  -0.13  0.47* 0.06  0.46**  0.04 
  (0.11) (0.13)    (0.15) (0.11)  (0.38) (0.36)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.26) (0.13)  (0.23) (0.13) 
   Cash*Size  0.76*  0.75**    0.07 -0.17  -0.66**  -0.70** 0.71*  0.71**  -0.39 0.01  -0.33 0.06 
  (0.39) (0.35)    (0.16) (0.11)  (0.34) (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.31)  (0.25) (0.12)  (0.23) (0.13) 
   # obs.  379  390    196  204  469  492  651  671  1984  2084  2721  2862 
 
Notes: Estimates are the coefficients on the financial constraints variable (Cash) and interaction term between Cash and Size (with Size measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 
for large firms). The “q” estimates are of equation (9) and “Euler” estimates are of equation (16). Standard errors are in parentheses. *  and ** denotes significance at the 10% and 
5% level, respectively. 
(1) Includes Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
(2) Includes Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
(3) Includes Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
(4) The pre-encaje period is extended to 1993 (or in some cases 1994) in order to have sufficient observations for meaningful estimation.  48
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Figure 5: Investment/Capital (I/K) for Chilean Firms
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